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ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
IN RETALIATION CASES
Brian A. Riddellt
Richard A. Balestt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Employees X, Y, and Z all work for Company A. These employees
individually file complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), against Company A, because of perceived sexual
harassment. Subsequently, a supervisor of employee X solicits other
employees to make negative comments about employee X. Further,
employee Y receives a negative year-end performance evaluation. Because a condition of employment requires positive performance evaluations in order to receive pay increases, employee Y is precluded from
receiving a pay raise. Additionally, employee Z is denied a promotion
to a position for which he or she is highly qualified.
This hypothetical presents the issue of whether an action is an adverse employment action, warranting retaliation claims under Title
VII. The circuits are split three ways on this issue. One group of circuits adopts an "expansive" approach, defining adverse employment
action broadly to include any action that is reasonably likely to deter
alleged victims or others from engaging in future protected activity.l
Under this approach, X, Y, and Z have been subjected to an adverse
employment action, because the employer's behavior is likely to deter
them, or others, from engaging in protected activity in the future. 2
A second group of circuits adopts an "intermediate" approach,
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that
adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. 3
Under this approach, employee X has not suffered an adverse employment action unless he or she can prove that the negative comments
somehow affected a term, condition, or benefit of employment. 4 Similarly, employee Z has not suffered an adverse employment action unless he or she can demonstrate that the failure to consider him or her

t Associate, Keating, Muething, & Klekamp (Cincinnati, Ohio).
tt Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Chase College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. See, e.g., id.
3. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th
Cir. 1997)).
4. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243).
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for the promotion somehow affected a term, benefit, or condition of
his or her employment. 5 However, employee Y may have suffered an
adverse employment action when he or she received negative comments on his or her year-end evaluation because it prevented him or
her from receiving a pay raise, which negatively affected a benefit of
employment (i.e., pay raises) and a term and condition of employment (i.e., receiving positive performance reviews is a prerequisite to
receiving pay increases). 6
A third group of circuits adopts a "restrictive" approach, holding
that only ultimate employment decisions-such as hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting-constitute actionable adverse employment actions. 7 Under this approach, neither employee Xnor employee Yhas
suffered an adverse employment action because negative comments
from fellow employees, negative comments on performance reviews,
and failures to obtain pay raises do not constitute ultimate employment decisions. s Employee Z, however, has suffered an adverse employment action because matters concerning promotions constitute
ultimate employment decisions. 9
This article argues that the circuits should adopt the expansive approach in determining what constitutes adverse employment action in
the retaliation context. Part II discusses generally the burden-shifting
framework used by the circuits in evaluating retaliation claims under
Tide VII. Part III provides a detailed overview of the expansive, intermediate, and restrictive approaches used by the circuits in determining what actions constitute adverse employment actions. Part IV
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Further,
Part IV argues that the circuits should adopt the expansive approach,
explains why they should adopt the expansive approach, and sets forth
the effect this approach will have on employees and employers. Part V
concludes that the expansive approach is the best policy approach because: (1) its broad definition of adverse employment action provides
employees complete protection against unlawful retaliation; (2) it establishes a threshold level of substantiality that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause;
(3) it effectuates the letter and purpose of Tide VII; (4) it is not outcome determinative; and (5) it facilitates conformity between § 2000e3 and § 2000e-2 of Tide VII.

5. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243).
6. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243).
7. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Page v.
Bolger, 645 F.2d 227,233 (4th Cir. 1981) (defining "ultimate employment
decisions") ).
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See id.
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THE TITLE VII BURDEN-SHIFfING FRAMEWORK

Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects two
kinds of conduct against retaliation. 1O First, an employee is protected
from retaliation for participating in any administrative or judicial investigation, proceeding, or hearing, to enforce rights under Title
VILlI Second, an employee is protected from retaliation for opposing, in good faith, any practices that the employee reasonably believes
are prohibited by Title VIU2
In retaliation cases, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. 13 Specifically, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the
employer was aware of the plaintiff's protected participation or opposition, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision
thereafter, and (4) some causal connection exists between the activity
and the adverse employment action. 14 These elements must be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence. 15
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action."16 If the employer meets
this burden, the presumption of retaliation is negated, and the plaintiff is then required to present evidence proving that the reason offered by the employer was in reality a pretext for unlawful
discriminationP The plaintiff can do this by establishing that the defendant's proffered reason: "(1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the adverse action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the
adverse action."18 Throughout this burden-shifting framework, "the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion."19
Despite the circuit courts' universal adoption of this burden-shifting
framework for analyzing retaliation claims, these courts vary widely as
to how each element is satisfied. Specifically, the circuit courts disagree as to the meaning of adverse employment action. 20
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003).
11. [d.
12. [d.
13. See, e.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537,541 (6th Cir. 2003).

14. [d. (citing Strouss v. Mich. Dep't of Co IT., 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001);
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559,563 (6th Cir. 2000».
15. [d.
16. [d. at 542 (quoting Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563).
17. [d. (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084

(6th Cir. 1994».
18. [d. (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084).
19. [d. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993».
20. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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The circuits are split three ways regarding the meaning of adverse
employment action in the retaliation context. The United States
Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits, as well as the EEOC, have adopted the expansive approach. These circuits define adverse employment action broadly to
include any action that is reasonably likely to deter alleged victims or
others from engaging in future protected activities. 21 However, the
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits take the intermediate approach,
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment. 22 The
21. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that employer's elimination of employee meetings, termination of flexible
start-time policy, institution of workplace "Iockdown," disproportionate reduction in an employee's workload and salary, and creation of a hostile
work environment amount to adverse employment actions); Wideman v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that
adverse employment actions include a requirement that an employee work
without a lunch break, giving an employee a one-day suspension, soliciting
other employees for negative statements about a particular employee,
changing an employee's schedule without notification, making negative
comments about an employee, and needlessly delaying authorization for
medical treatment); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that retaliation includes "actions like moving the person from a
spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support services . . . or cutting off challenging assignments"); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (lOth Cir. 1996)
(holding that adverse employment action includes malicious prosecution
against a former employee); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (lst
Cir. 1994) (holding that "demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees" constitute adverse employment
actions); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-32 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that an employer's cancellation of a public event honoring an
employee can constitute an adverse employment action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [hereinafter ADEA], which has an anti-retaliation provision parallel to that in Title VII); U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 8-II.D.3, available at hup:/ /
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html(last modified July 6,2000) [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL] (adverse employment action means "any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity").
22. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
"retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ...
[to] constitute [an] 'adverse employment action"'); Torres v. Pisano, 116
F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that in order to demonstrate an adverse employment action, an employee must demonstrate "a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment") (quoting
McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 623
(S.D.N.Y. 1995».
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Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the restrictive approach, holding that
only ultimate employment decisions-such as hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting-constitute actionable adverse employment
actions. 23
A.

Expansive Approach

A majority of the circuits, as well as the EEOC, have adopted an
expansive definition of adverse employment action, which encompasses any action that is reasonably likely to deter the alleged victim or
others from engaging in future protected activity.24 An example is
Ray v. Henderson,25 a case decided in 2000 by the United"~tates Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The plaintiff in this case was William Ray, a rural postal carrier in
Willits, California, who alleged retaliation by his superiors for his involvement in protected activity.26 At the Willits Post Office, Ray's immediate supervisor was Dale Briggs and the Postmaster was Dan
Carey.27 In 1994, Ray and some of his co-workers grew anxious about
sexual bias and harassment directed toward female employees at the
Willits Post Office. 28 A female employee first addressed this harassment at an Employee Involvement meeting in March 1994, when the
employee raised her hand and asked to speak. 29 Carey, however, "immediately wheeled around, swinging his arm, yelled and pointed. He
ordered [the employee] out of the meeting."30 Mter the female employee left, Ray raised his objections to the negative treatment of female employees at the post office. 31 Carey denied the charges and
called Ray a "liar.,,32
Ray again complained about the treatment of female employees at
the post office at a Rural Carriers Employee Involvement meeting in
April 1994. 33 Again, Carey refuted the charges. 34 Because these complaints were continuously denied and ignored, Ray, along with two of
his co-workers, wrote a letter to Lito Sajones, Carey's supervisor, con23. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Page v.
Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981))); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122
F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "a transfer involving minor
changes in working conditions and no reduction in payor benefits" is not
an adverse employment action).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
26. [d. at 1237, 1239.
27. [d. at 1237.
28. [d.
29. [d.
30. [d.
31. [d.
32. [d.
33. [d.
34. [d.

318

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 34

cerning the complaints. 35 Following this letter, Briggs and Carey publicly berated Rayon numerous occasions. 36 During a staff meeting in
November 1994, Ray made a proposal for improving efficiency, for
which Briggs scolded him.37 In December 1994, Carey called Ray a
"rabble rouser" and a "troublemaker," and threatened to cancel all
future Employee Involvement meetings. 38 Further, Carey threatened
to end the "self management" policy that permitted the employees to
establish the times they would come to and leave work. 39 Additionally,
Ray was forced to leave a meeting with Briggs and Carey concerning
the employees' rights to communicate with each other after Carey rebuked him and made intimidating gestures. 40
In Febru~ry 1995, Carey followed through on his threat and eliminated the Employee Involvement program and the self management
policy.41 Specifically, all carriers in rural areas were obligated to start
work at 7:00 a.m.42 This change resulted in less time for Ray to sort
letters and magazines before he began his route, and forced him to
stay at work later in the day so he could complete administrative work
that he had, prior to the change in policy, been able to complete earlier in the day.43 In May 1995, Ray requested permission to begin
working at 6:30 a.m. in order to leave work early to care for his ailing
wife. 44 Briggs agreed, but he threatened to withdraw this concession
on numerous occasions. 45
Briggs' and Carey's hostility toward Ray continued through the fall
of 1995. 46 Once, during an office meeting, Briggs yelled at Ray to
'''shut up' and 'that's a direct order."'47 Moreover, false misconduct
charges were levied against Rayon two separate occasions. 48
Ray requested counseling with the EEOC in October 1995, alleging
that the management at the Willits Post Office employed a "singlingout-and-punish method of controlling and frightening and eventually
demoralizing the workers."49 Additionally, Ray's EEOC request
averred that four people had vocalized to him their feeling that the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1238.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Superintendent of Postal Operations should be killed, demonstrating
that the issue was not isolated to his complaints. 50
In November 1995, Ray went on stress leave. 51 During that time,
Carey received a copy of Ray's [EEOC] complaint and instituted a
"lockdown" at the post office. 52 Carey alleged that the lockdown was
necessary "because Ray's complaint to the [EEOC] contained a death
threat. "53 Briggs then ordered Ray not to return to work pending the
Postal Inspector's investigation into whether the letter was in fact a
threat. 54 Ray was allowed to return to work after the Inspector concluded that the letter did not contain a death threat. 55 Nevertheless,
Bill Wilber, a temporary supervisor, told the employees that Ray had
made a death threat. 56 Further, Carey terminated Ray's 6:30 a.m. start
time and required him to report for work at 7:00 a.m. 57 This action
was taken "in response to the supposed death threat ... because [Ray]
'had to be supervised at all times.' "58
Ray then wrote four complaint letters to the EEOC between December 1995 and April 1996. 59 Ray's route was then lessened by ninety
boxes. This reduction cost Ray approximately $3,000 out of his yearly
salary.60 Although all postal workers' routes were to some degree decreased, Ray's decrease was the most severe. 61
On May 28, 1997, an administrative law judge (ALJ) heard Ray's
complaint. 62 "The ALJ found that the United States Postal Service
(USPS) had retaliated against Ray after he filed his written EEOC
counseling request."63 The USPS denied these findings on August 13,
1997. 64 Ray responded with a complaint filed in federal district court,
alleging, among other claims, that the USPS retaliated against him for
engaging in protected activity.65 The district court granted the
USPS's motion for summary judgment, and Ray appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. 66
50. [d. at 1238-39.
51. [d. at 1239.
52. [d. Lock-down means that the loading dock doors were to be locked at all
times. [d. The result was that for each carrier, entry into the docks which
should have taken seconds actually took several minutes. [d.
53. [d.
54. [d.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

60. [d.
61. [d.
62. [d.

63. [d.
64. [d.
65. [d.
66. [d. On appeal, Ray chose to challenge the grant of summary judgment only
as to the retaliation claim. [d.
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On appeal, the parties stipulated that Ray's EEOC complaints regarding the treatment of female employees were protected activities,
but disputed whether Ray suffered adverse employment actions. 67 In
particular, Ray asserted that, in retaliation for staging complaints, Carey and Briggs disbanded the Employee Involvement program, abolished flexible start times, introduced lockdowns, cut back his
workload (and hence his salary), and reduced his workload disproportionately to reductions imposed on other employees. 68
The Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging the three-way split
among the circuits in defining adverse employment action. 69 The
Ninth Circuit continued by observing that it has already "found that a
wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment actions."70 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
these cases place it with those circuits that take an expansive view of
the type of actions that can be considered adverse employment
actions. 71
Despite this precedent, the USPS argued that the Ninth Circuit
should adopt the restrictive approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits. 72 The USPS relied on the 1998 United States Supreme Court
case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,73 "for the proposition that
only ultimate employment actions such as 'hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities
[and] a decision causing a significant change in benefits' constitute
adverse employment actions. ,,74
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Burlington Industries dealt
with employment actions that subject employers to vicarious responsi67. Id. at 1240.
68. Id. at 1243-44.
69. Id. at 1240.
70. Id. at 1240-41 (discussing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that dissemination of an unfavorable job reference is an
adverse employment action, even though the poor reference did not affect
the prospective employer's decision not to hire the plaintiff); see also
Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that while "mere ostracism" by co-workers does not constitute an adverse employment action, a lateral transfer does; and adverse employment actions also include exclusions from meetings, seminars, and
positions that would make an employee eligible for salary increases, as well
as being given a more burdensome work schedule while being denied secretarial support); Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that "[tJransfers of job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would constitute 'adverse employment decisions'''); St.John
v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 642 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
a transfer to another job of the same pay and status may constitute an adverse employment action).
71. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.
72. Id. at 1242.
73. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
74. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 n.5.
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biIity for harassment, if such acts are taken by supervisors. 75 Further,
the Ninth Circuit pointed out that despite the Supreme Court's citation to circuit court Title VII cases defining adverse employment actions, the Court specifically did not adopt those cases' holdings:
"Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it
prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment action for
resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here."76
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits' restrictive approach because the court could not reconcile such a rule with its prior decisions. 77 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit noted it had already held that lateral transfers, unfavorable
references that have no affect on a prospective employer's hiring decisions, and the imposition of a more burdensome work schedule do
not constitute ultimate employment actions. 78 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit stated that it could not adopt the intermediate approach utilized by the Second and Third Circuits because that approach did not
comport with Ninth Circuit precedent. 79 In particular, the Ninth Circuit observed that although "some actions that [it] consider[s] to be
adverse (such as disadvantageous transfers or changes in work schedules) do 'materially affect the terms and conditions of employment,'
others (such as an unfavorable reference not affecting an employee's
job prospects) do not."80
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit looked to the EEOC's interpretation of
adverse employment action in adopting the expansive approach. 81
The EEOC has interpreted adverse employment action to mean "any
adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."82 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the EEOC
interpretation includes "lateral transfers, unfavorable job references,
and changes in work schedules ... [because such] actions are all reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity."83 The Ninth Circuit did state, however, that this interpretation
does not contemplate all offensive statements by co-workers because
not all offensive statements discourage employees from participating
in protected activity.84
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761).
77. Id. at 1242.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 21, at § 8-II.D.3.
83. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
84. Id.
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that the EEOC test "effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII."85 Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a), it is unlawful to discriminate against an employee for exercising
his right to engage in protected activity.86 As such, the Ninth Circuit
found that the provision does not constrain the form of discrimination covered, and neither does the provision require that an action
meet a minimum gravity.87 In fact, according to the Ninth Circuit, the
harshness of the action in relation to the employee relates to the measure of damages, not liability.88
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit adopted the EEOC test, holding that an action constitutes "an adverse employment action if it is
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity."89 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that because Briggs' retaliatory actions decreased Ray's pay, the amount of time Ray had available
to complete his assignments, and his ability to voice opinions and affect the post office's policy, the supervisors' behavior qualified as an
adverse employment action because it was "reasonably likely to deter
Ray or other employees from complaining about discrimination."9o
Further, the Ninth Circuit suggested that such activity created a hostile work environment, which can provide the basis for a retaliation
claim under Title VII. 91 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits of the retaliation claim. 92

B.

Intennediate Approach

Another group of circuits has adopted an intermediate approach,
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment. 93 An example of this approach is the Fourth Circuit case of Von Gunten v.
Maryland. 94
In Von Gunten, the plaintiff, Barbara von Gunten, was employed as
an Environmental Health Aide III by the Maryland Department of the
Environment (MDE).95 Mter von Gunten's sixth week of work at the
MDE, William Beatty, the head of the Shellfish Monitoring Section,
gave von Gunten a favorable review, stating that she had demon85. Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003).
87. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.
1996)).
88. Id. (quoting Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1244.
91. Id. at 1245-46.
92. Id. at 1246.
93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
94. 243 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001).
95. Id. at 861.
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strated motivation and that she could work well with the other employees. 96 In June 1996, von Gunten was assigned to full-time boat
work under the supervision of Vernon Burch, collecting water samples
from the Chesapeake Bay.97 Beatty supervised both von Gunten and
Burch. 98
Soon after she started working with Burch problems appeared. 99
Von Gunten claimed that Burch "urinated off of the boat, made
coarse and sexually charged comments toward her, stared at her, and
touched her without her consent."lOO In August 1996, von Gunten
complained about the sexual harassment to Beatty.lOI Beatty then
contacted Burch's supervisor, John Steinfort, who met with Burch,
von Gunten, and Beatty.102 Beatty and Steinfort distributed the MDE.
anti-harassment policy to von Gunten and Burch, explaining that sexual harassment between employees was prohibited. 103 Mter the meeting, however, von Gunten complained to the supervisors that Burch's
conduct had worsened. 104
In December 1996, Beatty watched von Gunten and Burch working.
He witnessed von Gunten acting unprofessionally, and the next day
saw Burch strike "von Gunten across the buttocks with an oar."105
Subsequently, von Gunten requested from Steinfort that she be removed from Burch's boat, to which Steinfort agreed. 106
On the following day, von Gunten told Steinfort that she planned to
communicate her harassment concerns to MDE's Fair Practices Office.10 7 That same day, Steinfort contacted Steven Bieber, an MDE
Fair Practices officer, and MDE's personnel director, to tell them he
did not believe that von Gunten's claim could be substantiated. 108
The next day, von Gunten mailed a letter to the MDE's Fair Practices
offices requesting its assistance. 109 In response to von Gunten's letter,
Bieber undertook an investigation, concluding that despite some evidence of harassment, the harassment did not rise to such a level as to
constitute an abusive working environmentYo
96. Id. at 862.
97. Id. at 861-62. An aide generally spends the three winter months conducting
shoreline surveys, and the remaining nine months of the year performing
boat work. Id.
98. Id. at 862.
99. Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
110. Id.
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Von Gunten claimed that MDE's actions following her letter to
their Fair Practices Office amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VILlll Among MDE's actions were the repossession of
her state-issued car, a down-grade in her annual evaluation, a reassignment to shoreline survey work, improperly handled administrative affairs, and retaliatory harassment that created a hostile work
environment. I 12
In August 1997, MDE offered von Gunten a new aide position,
which "would have required her to spend less time on boat work and
more time performing shoreline surveys."ll3 Additionally, the new
position would have required von Gunten to spend more time working in the same field office as Beatty and Steinfort, likely increasing
their contact. 1l4 Von Gunten declined the offer. ll5
Von Gunten met with officials from MDE's Fair Practices Office
concerning her claims of harassment and retaliation in October
1997Y6 Believing that the MDE Fair Practice officers were unconcerned with her claims, von Gunten resigned the following monthY 7
After receiving notice from the EEOC of her right to sue, von
Gunten filed suit against MDE, alleging sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation under Title VIL l18 The district court
granted MDE's motion for summary judgment concerning her constructive discharge and retaliation claimsY9 The court denied summary judgment of von Gunten's sexual harassment claim.120 The
sexual harassment claim was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of MDE.121 Von Gunten then appealed the jury verdict to
the Fourth Circuit. 122
The Fourth Circuit initially responded to the EEOC view that, unlike 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), which prohibits discriminatory employment action, § 2000e-3 prohibits both adverse employment
actions, and "any retaliatory conduct by an employer that is reasonably
likely to deter protected activity."123 The Fourth Circuit noted that it
had repeatedly held that retaliation claims, like discrimination claims,
require proof of an adverse employment action. 124 The Fourth CirIll. Id.
112. Id. at 862-63.
113. Id. at 863.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 863 n.l; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 through 3 (2003).
124. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863 n.l (citing Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355,365 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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cuit continued by acknowledging Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
which explained that Congress did not express a greater intent to preclude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for precluding discrimination
under § 2000e-2.I25 As such, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
absent strong policy considerations to the contrary, the courts should
construe the provisions of Title VII uniformly.126
Next, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issues of how to define adverse employment action, and whether MDE's actions constituted
such conduct. I27 Von Gunten and the EEOC argued that the lower
court's definition of adverse employment action as an "'ultimate employment decision' involving hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating" was far too narrow. 128 MDE rejected this
interpretation of the lower court's analysis, arguing that the court did
not adopt such a narrow interpretation of adverse employment action. 129 Instead, MDE argued that the district court properly defined
adverse employment action as employer conduct that alters the
"terms, conditions, or benefits of employment" in a discriminatory
manner. 130
The Fourth Circuit next stated that differentiating between the two
standards is difficult. 131 To illustrate this contention, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that despite most circuits' rejection of the restrictive
approach in Title VII retaliation cases, these courts still "recognize [ ]
that 'there is some threshold level of substantiality that must be met
for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation
clause."'132 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit observed that the similarity
between the two standards is exemplified by the fact that although the
Eighth Circuit has formally adopted the restrictive approach, it continually applies a broader standard. I33 Further, the Fourth Circuit observed that if strictly applied, the restrictive approach, may be
outcome determinative in that its application would prevent von
Gunten from making out a prima facie case, as none of MDE's acts
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 366).
Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 366).
Id. at 863.
Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
Id. (citing Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that working conditions that constitute a material employment disadvantage and tangible changes in working conditions would be
ultimate employment decisions)); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046,
1060 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that ultimate employment decisions include
reducing employee duties, actions that disadvantage or interfere with an
employee's ability to perform job functions, "papering" employment files
with negative reports and reprimands despite the employee not being discharged, demoted, or suspended).
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amounted to an ultimate employment decision (such as hiring, firing,
refusal to promote, etc.).134
Thus, because the Fourth Circuit had already expressed preference
for conformity between § 2000e-2 and § 2000e-3 135 and implicitly rejected the view that "nothing less than an 'ultimate employment decision' can constitute adverse employment action under § 2000e-3,"136
the Von Gunten court adopted the intermediate approach, which defines adverse employment action as "any retaliatory act or harassment
if, but only if, that act or harassment results in an adverse effect on the
'terms, conditions, or benefits' of employment."137 The Fourth Circuit then applied the intermediate approach to von Gunten's claims
that MDE unlawfully retaliated against her by: (1) withdrawing her use
of a state vehicle, (2) "downgrading" her end of the year performance
review, (3) reassigning her to shoreline survey work, (4) improperly
treating a variety of administrative matters, and (5) retaliating against
her by creating a hostile work environment. 138
First, the Von Gunten court held that MDE's decision to deny von
Gunten the use of a state vehicle was not an adverse employment action sufficient to support a Title VII retaliation claim because it was
unclear that use of the car was a benefit of employment, and because
von Gunten could not have expected to use the vehicle permanently.139 Second, the Von Gunten court held that MDE's decision to
downgrade von Gunten's end-of-the-year evaluation was not an adverse employment action because, at the time of the review, MDE was
in the process of changing to a different evaluation form and von
Gunten received negative ratings under both forms.14o Third, the Von
134. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 864 (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702,705-08 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that negative reviews requiring an
employee to lose pay increases, requiring an employee to wear an unsafe
fire protection suit, verbally threatening to fire an employee, improperly
placing in jeopardy an employee's continuation in an apprenticeship program, and committing numerous other acts of harassment causing an employee to suffer depression and panic attacks, did not reach the level of
adverse employment action)).
135. Id. at 865 (quoting Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355,
366 (4th Cir. 1985)).
136. Id. (citing Ross, 759 F.2d at 363) (holding that actions such as reducingjob
responsibilities and professional status, denying performance reviews and
annual salary and benefit increases, and providing false information to potential employers, if proven, could rise to adverse employment action);
Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1997)
(observing that" [iJ n no case in this circuit have we found an adverse employment· action to encompass a situation where the employer has instructed employees to ignore and spy on an employee who engaged in
protected activity, without evidence that the terms, conditions, or benefits of her
employment were adversely aJJectetl') (emphasis added)).
137. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866.
138. Id. at 867-70.
139. Id. at 867.
140. Id. at 867-68.
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Gunten court held that MDE's decision to postpone von Gunten's endof-the-year evaluation by one month was not an adverse employment
action in violation of Title VII because there was no indication that
the postponement adversely affected von Gunten. 14I Fourth, the Von
Gunten court held that MDE's decision to reassign von Gunten from
boat work to shoreline survey work did not rise to unlawful retaliation
because the change was not truly significant. 142 Fifth, even after considering all of MDE's acts, the Von Gunten court concluded that the
totality of the actions did not constitute "retaliatory harassment creating a hostile work environment."143 For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. 144
C.

Restrictive Approach

A third group of circuits has adopted a restrictive approach, holding that only ultimate employment actions (such as hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion) constitute adverse employment
actions. 145 An example of this approach is the Fifth Circuit case of
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak CO. 146
In Mattern, the plaintiff, Jean Mattern, was an employee with Eastman Kodak Co. and was enrolled in Eastman's mechanic's apprenticeship program. 147 The program's two components consisted of on-thejob training and classroom instruction. 148 To complete the program,
apprentices were required to successfully complete fourteen "review
cycles."149 Adequate performance through each cycle resulted in pay
increases. 15o "Major Skills Tests" were also part of the program. 151 An
apprentice could be removed from the program for receiving three
unsatisfactory "review cycle" assessments or failing three Major Skills
Tests. 152
In March 1993, Mattern filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC. 153
In her filed charge, Mattern alleged that she was sexually harassed by
two members of her on-the-job training crew, Godwin and Roberts. 154
She further alleged that the harassment created a hostile work envi141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 867 n.5.
Id.
[d. at 869-70.
[d. at 870.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
[d. at 703.
Id.
Id.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 703-04.
[d. at 704.
Id.
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ronment, and that her supeIVisors not only knew of the harassment,
but condoned it. 155
Eastman had become aware of and began investigating Mattern's
claims in early March. 156 Although no action was taken against Roberts, Eastman allowed Godwin to retire early.157 Mattern was then
transferred to a different crew in the same department; thus, she
worked under another supeIVisor, while she retained the same departmental managers. 158
Mattern continued to encounter difficulties on the job, which she
believed to be unlawful retaliation, and which led to her resignation
in July 1993. 159 Mattern sued Eastman in November 1993, alleging
that Eastman retaliated against her, and that Eastman allowed employees to retaliate against her for her report of harassment to the
EEOC. 160
Mattern's retaliation claim was based on five events. 161 First, Eastman began disciplinary proceedings against Godwin on the same day
that Mattern informed Drennan that she suffered from a work-related
illness. 162 Mattern was directed by Drennan to report her work-related
illness to Eastman's medical department. 163 Mattern, however, decided to take a vacation day and left for home. 164 Eastman then sent
Drennan, and another one of Mattern's supeIVisors, Holstead, to Mattern's house to direct her to report to Eastman's medical
department. I 65
Second, in March 1993, Mattern was disciplined for failing to be at
her workstation when her supeIVisors were trying to find her.166 She
was not there because she was reporting the hostility she believed she
was receiving to Eastman's Human Resources Department. 167
Third, Mattern alleged that her co-workers became antagonistic toward her following Godwin's departure. 168 Specifically, her co-workers
did not say "hello" to her, muttered that "accidents happen," and stole
tools out of her locker. 169 Mattern alleged that Eastman took no steps
to remedy the situation, despite its knowledge of the hostility.170
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 705.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. (internal quotations omitted).
[d.
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Fourth, Mattern claimed that Eastman failed to respond to Mattern's doctor's concerns that her illnesses and anxiety were attributable to the hostilitY that she was receiving at Eastman. 171
Fifth; Mattern received a negative review following her EEOC
charge, which prevented her from receiving a raise, and she was
placed on "final warning of discharge from the apprenticeship program."172 Notably, Mattern received negative evaluations from supervisors who previously had commended her work. 173 Many of these
poor reviews were the result of Mattern's failure to restore centrifugal
pumps. 174 Additionally, Mattern failed two of her Major Skills
Tests. 175
A jury found that Eastman had retaliated against Mattern and
awarded her $50,000 in damages. 176 Eastman then appealed to the
Fifth Circuit. 177
The Fifth Circuit began by acknowledging that it had already held
that "Tide VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions."178
According to the Fifth Circuit, hiring, leave, discharge, promotion,
and compensation decisions constitute ultimate employment decisions. 179 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that co-worker hostility,
stolen tools, and the resultant anxiety, alone, do not amount to adverse employment actions. 180 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held Drennan's visit to Mattern's home, the verbal threat of discharge, the
warning for being away from her workstation, a lost increase in pay,
and Mattern's placement on "final warning" was not tantamount to
adverse employment actions because none of the acts complained of
had demonstrable consequences. 181 Specifically, the Mattern court
held that the actions Mattern complained of "were at most 'tangential'
to future decisions that might be ultimate employment decisions."182
To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit stated that although the future possibility of discharge from the apprenticeship program existed for Mattern, that is quite distinct from actual discharge. 183 Additionally, the
Mattern court held that although the acts Mattern complained of may
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

[d. at 706.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 704.
See id.
[d. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995».
[d.
[d.
[d. at 708.
[d.
[d.
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have increased the chance of eventual adverse employment actions,
the acts themselves were not ultimate employer decisions, and they
had merely a tangential effect on speculative future ultimate employer
decisions. 184
The Fifth Circuit continued, stating that another rule would improperly enlarge the scope of adverse employment action to include
"disciplinary filings, supervisor's reprimands, and even poor performance by the employee-anything which might jeopardize employment
in the future."185 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that adverse employment action refers only to ultimate employment decisions-not
decisions that may lead to ultimate employment decisions. 186
The Mattern court found support for this rule in the language of
Title VII. 187 In particular, the Fifth Circuit examined the differences
between Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, and
Title VII's general anti-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2.188 The Mattern court first noted that the general anti-discrimination provision precludes employers from limiting, segregating, or classifying employees in ways that deprive or might deprive any
individual's employment opportunities or would adversely affect his
status as an employee. 189 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title
VII's anti-retaliation simply forbids employers from discriminating
against employees for taking protected action. 190
The Fifth Circuit concluded: "The anti-retaliation provision speaks
only of 'discrimination'; there is no mention of the vague harms contemplated in § 2000e-2(a)(2). Therefore, [the anti-retaliation] provision can only be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include
only ultimate employment decisions."191 For these reasons, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the jury's conclusion that Eastman unlawfully retaliated against Mattern. 192
N.
A.

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Intermediate Approach

Under the intermediate approach, adverse employment action is
defined as "discriminatory acts or harassment [that] adversely [affect]
'the terms, conditions, or benefits' of the plaintiffs employment."193
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708-09; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 through 3 (2003).
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2003».
Id. at 708 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3 (2003».
Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997».
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The intermediate framework is a good approach because it sets out a
threshold level of substantiality that must be met before unlawful discrimination can be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause. As
with the expansive approach, adverse employment decisions, under
the intermediate approach, include ultimate employment decisions,
reducingjob responsibilities and professional status, denying performance reviews and annual salary and benefit increases, as well as providing false information to potential employers. Because of this
threshold, not every offensive remark made by a co-worker will constitute an adverse employment action warranting a retaliation claim.
Thus, employers need not worry about trivial utterances resulting in
liability.
Despite this strength, the intermediate approach is inferior to the
expansive approach. Unlike the expansive approach, discriminatory
acts alone, such as supervisor ostracism, spying on employees, pranks
against employees, and creating an overall hostile work environment,
do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions. A cause of
action for retaliation will arise only if this discrimination affects the
"terms, conditions, or benefits" of employment. Thus, under the intermediate approach, an employer who retaliates against an employee
for filing a complaint with the EEOC by verbally abusing the employee, and/or encouraging other employees to harass the employee,
is not subject to liability for unlawful retaliation because such activity
does not affect "the 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of
employment."194
This hypothetical illustrates that the intermediate approach is
overly restrictive because it allows employers to retaliate against employees and/ or harass employees in ways that fall short of constituting
ultimate employment decisions, or resulting in an adverse effect on
"the 'terms, conditions, or benefits of employment."'195 Accordingly,
the intermediate approach is not the best policy approach because it
does not provide employees with complete protection from employer
retaliation.

B.

Restrictive Approach

Under the restrictive approach, only ultimate employment decisions, such as hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion, constitute adverse employment actions. 196 The circuits that have adopted
the expansive and intermediate approaches correctly agree that the
restrictive approach is not the best approach for three reasons. First,
the restrictive approach severely limits an employee's ability to seek
recourse when he or she is retaliated against or harassed for engaging
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
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in protected activity. Section 2000e-3 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for engaging in protected behavior. 197 The
restrictive approach, however, only recognizes a cause of action for
retaliation, in violation of Title VII, where the adverse employment
action concerned hiring, termination, promotion, or demotion. 198
Thus, under the restrictive approach, employers can avoid the consequences of 2000e-3, while still retaliating against an employee, by implementing a number of tactics that fall short of ultimate employment
actions. For example, under the restrictive approach, after an employee files a complaint with the EEOC, an employer could increase
that employee's workload and shorten the amount of time the employee has to complete the work. 199 Similarly, the employer could create a hostile work environment by encouraging other employees to
verbally abuse that employee and/or steal things from the employee,
without the employer subjecting itself to liability for unlawful retaliation because these adverse employment actions were not ultimate employment decisions. 20o
Second, as observed by the Von Gunten court, the restrictive approach is outcome determinative if strictly applied. 201 Consequently,
if none of an employer's acts amount to ultimate employment decisions, employees are automatically precluded from proving a prima
facie retaliation case. 202 Thus, in a circuit that utilizes the restrictive
approach, the employee in the example immediately above could not
make out a prima facie case of retaliation because verbal abuse and
creating a hostile work environment are not ultimate employment
decisions.
Third, circuits that utilize the restrictive approach incorrectly draw
distinctions between Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-3, and Title VII's general anti-discrimination provision, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2.203 However, both § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 claims
"require proof of 'adverse employment action.' "204 Accordingly, as
the Fourth Circuit has explained, Congress has not expressed a
greater intent to preclude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for precluding discrimination under § 2000e-2.205 Therefore, conformity between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 is preferred. 206
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2003).
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,864 (4th Cir. 2001).
See id.
See, e.g., Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863 n.l (citing Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985)).
205. Id. (quoting Rnss, 759 F.2d at 366).
206. Id. (quoting Rnss, 759 F.2d at 366).
197.
198.
199.
200.
20l.
202.
203.
204.
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Expansive Approach

Under the expansive approach, adverse employment action encompasses any action that is likely to deter the alleged victim or others
from engaging in protected activity.207 This interpretation, however,
does not extend to every insult made by a co-worker because such
statements do not "deter employees from engaging in protected activity."208 The circuits should adopt the expansive approach for five
reasons.
First, its broad definition of adverse employment action provides
employees more complete protection against unlawful retaliation. 209
The intermediate and restrictive approaches expose employees to potential retaliation because they allow employers to retaliate against
employees and/or harass employees in ways that fall short of constituting ultimate employment decisions, or result in an "adverse effect on
the 'terms, conditions, or benefits of employment."'210 Thus, under
the expansive approach, an employer who eliminates an employee's
lunch break,211 or deprives an employee of previously available support services,212 may be subject to liability for unlawful retaliation,
even though such activities do not involve ultimate employment decisions, and do not adversely affect the "terms, benefits, or conditions"
of employment.
Second, this standard establishes a threshold level of substantiality
that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under
the anti-retaliation clause. In particular, the expansive approach does
not encompass every insult made by employees. 213 Instead, it precludes only those activities reasonably likely to "deter employees from
engaging in protected activity."214 For example, unlawful retaliation
will occur when a supervisor instructs employees to harass another
employee because that employee filed a complaint with the EEOC.
On the other hand, one employee's off-handed derogatory remark to
another employee, who previously filed a complaint with the EEOC,
will not subject an employer to liability for retaliation. Thus, this objective standard gives employers guidance as to what type of behavior
rises to the level of unlawful retaliation, and protects employers from
liability for every trivial utterance that offends an employee or every
trivial employment decision that an employee does not like.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

212.
213.
214.

See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id.
See supra Part III.A (discussing the expansive approach).
See supra Part IILA-B (discussing the intermediate and restrictive
approaches) .
See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1455, 1456 (11th Cir.
1998).
See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
Id.
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Third, as the EEOC and the circuits that have adopted the expansive approach have recognized, this broad definition of adverse employment action "effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII."215
Section 2000e-3(a) states that it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he engaged in protected activity."216 This language in no way limits the severity of an employment
action's ultimate impact on an employee. 217 Rather, this language is
focused on preventing employers from taking any discriminatory action against an employee because that employee engaged in protected
activity. As such, discrimination in violation of § 2000e-3 should include ultimate employment decisions (termination, promotion, and
demotion), retaliatory acts or harassment that adversely affects the
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment (reducing job responsibilities and professional status, denying performance reviews and annual salary and benefit increases, unfavorable job references, lateral
transfers, and changes in work schedules), as well as ostracism, spying,
and pranks. 218 In fact, such actions "are all reasonably likely to deter
employees from engaging in protected activity"219 because such activity may intimidate employees to the point that they are reluctant to
file charges of discrimination. 22o
Fourth, the expansive approach is not outcome determinative.
Under this framework, even if an employer's action does not rise to
the level of ultimate employment decisions, or retaliatory acts or harassment that adversely affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment, an employee can still make out a prima facie case of
retaliation. 221 For example, an employee who is moved from a well-lit,
spacious office to a small, dark office, can still make out a prima facie
case of retaliation, even though this employment decision is not an
ultimate employment decision, and does not adversely affect the
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. 222
Fifth, the expansive approach does not incorrectly draw distinctions
between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2. Both § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2
claims "require proof of an 'adverse employment action.' "223 Accordingly, it is clear from the face of the statute that Congress did not
express a greater intent to preclude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than
for precluding discrimination under § 2000e-2.224 The expansive ap215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See, e.g., id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003).
Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
See, e.g., id.
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Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456.
See id.
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proach facilitates the preferred conformity between § 2000e-3 and
§ 2000e-2 by not making distinctions between the two provisions. 225
V.

CONCLUSION

The circuits are split three ways as to what constitutes an adverse
employment action in order for an employee to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 704(a) of Tide VII. One group of circuits, as well as the EEOC, adopts an expansive approach, defining
adverse employment action broadly to include any action that is reasonably likely to deter alleged victims or others from engaging in future protected activity.226 A second group of circuits adopts an
intermediate approach, holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that materially affects the terms, conditions or
benefits of employment. 227 A third group of circuits adopts a restrictive approach, holding that only ultimate employment actions, such as
hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting constitute actionable adverse
employment actions. 228
In light of this inconsistency, the circuits should universally adopt
the expansive approach for five reasons. 229 First, its broad definition
of adverse employment action provides employees complete protection against unlawful retaliation, which the intermediate and restrictive approaches fail to do. Second, this standard establishes a
threshold level of substantiality that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause. As such,
this objective standard gives employers guidance as to what type of
behavior rises to the level of unlawful retaliation, as well as protects
employers from liability for every trivial utterance that offended an
employee or every trivial employment decision that an employee did
not like. Third, this broad definition of adverse employment action
effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII by preventing employers from taking any discriminatory action against an employee because that employee engaged in protected activity. Fourth, the
expansive approach is not outcome determinative because it does not
immediately preclude employees from making out a prima facie case
of retaliation where the employer'S behavior falls short of an ultimate
employment decision or retaliatory acts or harassment that adversely
affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. Fifth, the expansive approach facilitates the preferred conformity between
§ 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 by not making distinctions between the two
provisions.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. (quoting /Wss, 759 F.2d at 366).
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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For these reasons, it is clear that the expansive approach is the best
way to protect employees from unlawful retaliation, protect employers
from frivolous claims, and give employers guidance as to what kinds of
behavior will constitute retaliation in violation of § 704(a) of Title VII.

